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TAX EVASION AND THE
ALLOCATION OF CAPITAL
ABSTRACT
The efficiency cost of capital misallocations between the corporate sector and the
noncorporate sector is typically measured using statutory tax differences. Corporate-source
income tax compliance is high because of third party reporting, however, while noncorporate
rental income tax compliance is low. Differential evasion thus exacerbates statutory differences
and enlarges the efficiency cost. To measure this effect, we build a numerical general
equilibrium model where households simultaneously choose portfolios of risky assets and
fractions of income to report.
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and NTBER1. Introduction
A large body of economics literature studies the problem of tax evasion. Starting
primarily with Allingham and Sandrno (1972), this literature considers the compliance decisions
of households in the face of uncertainty. These households may receive exogenous income, or
sometimes endogenous labor income, and they maximize expected utility given a probability and
cost of detection. Government policy can affect these decisions by varying the tax rate, the audit
rate, and the penalty on detected evasion. According to Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
estimates, however, underreporting of income now costs the U.S. government 100 billion dollars
a year, about 20 percent of income tax liability.
Most of this literature considers the evasion problem generally, or it concentrates on
labor rather than capital income.' Yet the IRS (1988) estimates that more than half of the total
loss in revenue is attributed to evasion of taxes on capital income.
A different large body of literature studies the problem of capital allocation. Starting
primarily with Arnold Harberger (1966), this literature considers the investment decisions of
corporate and noncorporate firms facing different tax rules. Because the corporate sector must
pay an additional layer of tax, it has a higher marginal effective tax rate and uses toolittle
capital. With a fixed total stock of capital, the noncorporate sector uses too much. Estimates
of the efficiency cost of such misallocation range around a half of one percent of national
income. However, the marginal effective tax rates are based on the incentives of firms facing
particular statutory provisions. The potential for tax evasion is ignored.2
Sandmo (1981) is an example. Cowell's (1990) book provides a collection of recent
developments in the tax evasion literature. Yaniv (1990) models the choice of evasion
between high-taxed capital income and low-taxed labor income, but he does not allow for
the endogenous determination of these two income sources. Landskroner, Muller, and
Swary (1991) consider a portfolio model with one riskiess asset and one risky asset,
where the evasion of labor income acts like investment in another risky asset.
2
Papersthat use marginal effective tax rates to measure capital misallocations include
Galper, Lucke and Toder (1988), Fullerton and Henderson (1989), and (llravelle (1989).-
Our paper attempts to bridge the gap between these two bodiesof literature. The evasion
of capital income is important not just because it may affect reportedincome and tax revenue,
but because it may affect the amount of investment and itsallocation.In this paper we
concentrate on modifications to the standard Harberger analysis,that is, how evasion affects the
allocation of a given stock of capital.
Evasion of capital income would not affect allocational efficiency if all assets were
equally prone to evasion, but such symmetry seems unlikely.Strict reporting requirements now
apply to banks and other intermediaries on their payments ofinterest and dividends, so evasion
is difficult. In contrast, evasion may be easier on noncorporate capital income. A landlord may
receive rents in cash, underreport that rental income, or overstate deductions for maintenance
expenses. If the noncorporate sector already pays loweffective tax under statutory provisions,
then differential evasion exacerbates misallocations and enlarges efficiency costs.
To measure the potential size of these effects, we build a numerical general equilibrium
model with two production sectors and with a household portfolio choice over one riskiess and
two risky financial assets. Only the risky noncorporate asset generates income that can be
evaded. Households weigh their evasion opportunities, evaluate the relative attractiveness of
assets, and determine their investment and consumption choices. A contribution here isthat
portfolio and evasion decisions are simultaneous. Households are aware of the subsequent
compliance problem when setting the initial portfolio, and decide on a jn regarding tax
compliance for each possible realization of the risky portfolio return. Thus capital allocation is
influenced both by tax rules and by IRS imposed audit rates and penalties. Another important-3-
contribution is that the risky portfolio decision and the risky evasion decision are determined
together using a single specification of risk aversion.
We first assume no evasion and simulate the removal of statutory tax differences among
the three assets. The efficiency gain is 15.9 billion dollars per year, or .706 percent of national
income, a figure comparable to those in the earlier Harberger literature that ignores evasion.
Next, using IRS estimates, we assume that 20 percent of noncorporate capital income is evaded
in the benchmark equilibrium. We then simulate the same removal of statutory tax differences
and find an efficiency gain of 21 .9 billion dollars. This measure of the efficiency cost of
misallocations is made 37 percent larger by the consideration of evasion.
We also use the model to evaluate specific policies. Increased enforcement can improve
allocational efficiency in our model, as well as raise revenue, but it is not costless. Additional
auditing entails a specific resource cost, while penalties increase risk-bearing. In our model, an
increase in either the audit rate or the penalty rate still yields a net welfare gain. Finally, the
Tax Reform Act of 1986 may have affected evasion incentives by reducing personal marginal
tax rates and by changing the relative taxation of different capital assets. We find that the
efficiency gain from this reform is doubled when we account for effects on evasion.
2. A Description of the Model
Our portfolio model builds on previous models by Slemrod (1982 and 1983), Galper,
Lucke, and Toder (1988), and Berkovec and Fullerton (1992). It includes bonds as a nskless
asset, and corporate equity and real estate as two risky assets. To illustrate the effect of evasion
on capital allocation, it is sufficient to have only one asset generate income that can be evaded.
We take that asset to be real estate, since rental income is not subject to independent information
reporting to the IRS. Thus we allow the underreported asset to interact with other fully reported-4-
assets, both riskiess and risky.The inclusion ofadditional risky assets would complicate the
investigation without adding any particular economic insights.
The reporting decision is described by a compliance model which extendsand generalizes
Allingham and Sandmo (1972). The basic model uses manyidentical consumers, all evading
part of rental income, but a later section investigatesthe difficulties and the results of using
multiple consumers at different income levels and tax brackets.The economy has two sectors,
a corporate sector and a non-corporate rental housing sector.Owner-occupied housing is
omitted.3 We assume perfect competition, full information, no externalities, perfect mobility,
and full employment of labor and capital. Data on original portfolio allocations forthe 1983
base year were obtained from the Survey of Consumer Finances by Berkovec andFullerton
(1992). This benchmark equilibrium is characterized by unequal effective tax treatmentof
different assets. Noncorporate income is subject only to personal income tax, whereas corporate
income faces an additional corporate tax. When government changes a tax policy parameter,
investors rearrange their portfolios and affect the aggregate supply of each asset. Relative prices
adjust and capital reallocates between the two sectors, until equilibrium is achievedin factor
markets as well as in product markets. An equivalent variation measures the dollar value to
households of the combined changes in tax rates, evasion choices, resource allocation, the
riskiness of income, and the consumption of each good.
2.1 Households.Eachhousehold faces uncertainty from two sources. First, evaded
income is detected with probability p, and it escapes detection with probability (l-p). Second,
real rates of return to corporate equity, rE, and to rental real state, rR, are stochastic. The real
The non-corporate sector consists of rental housing only. We abstract from the detailed
treatment of homeownership to concentrate on the choice between evadable real estate
and non-evadable corporate-source income and to avoid the difficulty of distinguishing
between consumption and investment characteristics of homeownership.-5-
return to debt, ru', is not stochastic. These market returns (with asterisks) are used below to
derive individual net-of-tax returns (with no asterisks). Then expected utility is
E( =ff [(1 -p) V(I) +pV(ld)] flr;,r)dr dr
(1)
where V(.) is the indirect utility function, and f(.) is the probability distribution function of the
returns. After-tax income is l if evasion is not detected and 'd if it is detected:
=Y+ r1JA+TEAE + AR(ltR6)
=Y + rDAD+rEAE+ rAR[l—tR —(atR+ 0) (1—6)]
Householdincome components include net asset income from debt AD,corporateequity AE, and
real estate A, and other income Y from after-tax labor earnings and government transfers (the
wage rate is endogenous to the model, but fixed to the individual). The fraction of taxable rental
income reported isthe marginal tax rate on rental income is tR; the proportional penalty on
detected tax underpayment is a; and 0isa psychic cost parameter that generates disutility when
evasion is detected. This non-monetary cost may include the embarrassment of being publicly
exposed as a tax-cheater and the value of time lost in litigation. We assume this cost 0 is
proportional to the income understatement. Successful evasion entails no such cost.
The probability of detection, p, is modeled as a decreasing function of the reporting
fraction ô (see, e.g. Kiepper and Nagin, 1989). More specifically,
(2) p =exp(a0 (a1—ö))
where a0 and a1 are parameters used to ensure that p takes values in the [0,1] inerval. This
feature of the model serves a dual purpose: first, it reflects the realistic result that, all things-6-
considered, additional evasion will increase the likelihood of anaudit;4 second, it makes the
overall enforcement effort and the administrative cost endogenous.
Consumers maximize a simple utility function, U -y0CH2, where C isthe corporate
good and H is housing. Substitution of demands backinto utility yields indirect utility:
______
1 (3)
V(I,P) = . - Yi2p
where P is the "ideal" price index, a function of prices and parameters. If the two exponents
sum to one, as in the Cobb Douglas case, the individual is riskneutral. In general, however,
the constant coefficient of relative risk aversion is $ 1-y-
'12•In all cases below, we use
fi>1,so -y and Y2 are negative. As long as the scalarin the utility function is also negative,
then utility is still increasing in C and H. Expenditures are still constant fractions of income,
defined after portfolio realizations, evasion, detection, and penalities. Armed with these
functional forms and parameter values, and facing a particular price vector, the consumer is
prepared to maximize expected utility in equation (1) by choosing the reporting fraction ö and
the asset vector A =(An,A, AR). Aggregate consumption demands for C and H are weighted
averages of demands based on 'd and demands based on I, using p and (l-p) as weights.
2,2 Personal Taxation. Labor income is taxed according to a simple linear structure
where the marginal tax rate is constant above L. Each asset receives a separate treatment by
the tax system in 1983. In the absence of evasion, the net-of-tax real rates of return are:
where w is the rate of inflation. For debt, the nominal interest rate is taxed at the investor's
marginal rate on interest income tD. Of the return to equity, net of corporate taxes, a fraction
We assume households know this probability function. They do not know whether they
will be audited, only the likelihood of an audit for every level of compliance.-7-
rD=(rD÷it)(1tD)Tt
= (r +it) [1et—(1—e)tG]— It
rR= [(r;in — t)(1 —tR)Y(I
—RZ) — d
eis distributed as dividends and taxed at personal rate tE, while (1-e) is retained and generates
accrued capital gains that are taxed at the effective rate on accrued capital gains, tG. The net
return to real estate holdings is calculated as in Berkovec and Fullerton (1992) by taking into
account maintenance expenses, m, property taxes, t, economic depreciation, d, and the present
value of the tax savings from capital consumption allowances, tRZ. These allowances are
discounted at the individual's net nominal risk-free rate (r + r) (1 -tD).
Owners of rental property report only a fraction 5 of their true income (rR -m -tn).
Letting the symbol r' stand for (rR -m-t)/(l-tRZ),the net return becomes rR'(l -t) -d
if evasion is successful, and rR'(l -tR-(1-b)(atR+ 0))- dotherwise.
Through taxation of stochastic asset income, government takes part of the variance as
well as part of the returns. Assuming perfect loss offset, the tax on the variance would enhance
individual welfare. However, the government cannot diversify better than fully-informed
individual investors with access to national asset markets. Therefore the risk received by
government does not 'disappear," but must still somehow affect the welfare of individuals. For
simplicity, we assume that this risk is returned in the form of a stochastic positive or negative
lump-sum transfer. Individuals cannot affect the amount of this additional transfer from the
government, but they recognize that it is correlated with the rates of return to their risky assets.
2.3 Production. The model includes two production sectors. The housing sector uses
capital only, so one unit of housing capital produces one unit of housing services H. In the
corporate sector, competitive firms produce C using capital K and labor L. Also, the firm is
assumed to finance this capital with a fixed ratio of debt to equity, b. The demand for equity
-- --8-
is thenE=K/(1+b),andthedemand for debt is D =- E.In order to measure the
corporate costofcapital,r,we examine the separatetax treatmentof equipment, structures,
land,inventories, andintangibles. FollowingHall andJorgenson(1967),
(5)
Tc=(T;+d)(l_k_UZ)/(1_u)+tpd
wherekisthe investment taxcredit,u thecorporate tax rate,Z the present value of capital
consumption allowances, and d is the exponential rate of economic depreciation. The property
tax rate t, and the parameters d, k, and Z differ by asset. The firm's discount rate, r, is a




This expression indicates that debt financing is favored by the deduction of interest payments
from the firm's taxable income. We assume that the firm is taxed at the top corporate marginal
tax rate and has sufficient liability to qualify for all available deductions and credits.
2.4 Government. In the raw data, observed household bond holdings exceed corporate
bond issues, so we attribute the difference to government bond issues. Similarly, the difference
between rental housing demand and rental housing holdings is attributed to government supply
of rental housing. These amounts are held constant during any simulation.
Revenue accrues from individual taxes on income from labor and capital, from corporate
income taxes, and from the return to rental property owned by government. Tax revenue from
housing capital is equal to expected revenue from each of the two possible outcomes of
detection, weighted by the probabilities of occurrence.-9-
Governmentspending consists of a lump-sum transfer to consumers which is held fixed
throughout,interest paymentson its debt, and consumption of the corporate good which is also
held fixedduring thesimulatiors.Partof tax revenue isspent on enforcementefforts as
capturedinan j administrative-cost function. Enforcementoutlays risewith the squareof
p,while a fixed cost is incurred regardless of the frequencyofaudits.5
When a single tax provision changes in any of the experiments, government revenue will
change. In order to maintain a balanced budget, a tax scalar is applied to all personal tax rates
and the corporate rate, determined endogenously by the model in its search for an equilibrium.6
3.Implementation. Data and Parameters
As described,themodelhas noanalyticalsolution. Thegeneralproblem involves the
entirejoint density functionof thetwo stochasticreturns.Therefore we use numericalmethods.
We assume specificfunctional formsforthe utilityfunction (described above)and production
function(constant elasticity of substitution). We also assume that the two stochastic returns are
distributed jointnormally, butwe usetheapproximationgivenby the Hermite integration
formula.We findsufficientaccuracyusingsix realizationsof eachreturn, so we evaluate utility
at 6x6 = 36realizations of thecombinedportfolioreturn.
A similar specification is used in Slemrodand Yitzhaki(1987).
6Inresponse to a tax policy change, the search foranew equilibrium iterates on a vector
of six "prices" thatincludes thethree expectedratesofreturn (rD, r,and rR"),the
endogenoustaxscalar for budget balance, and two endogenousscalarsthat indicatethe
amountofequityrisk andthe amountofreal estate risk that are returnedbygovernment
tohouseholds. Thesescalars are necessarybecausehouseholds needtoknow how much
risk they will receive from the government before they choose portfolios, but the chosen
portfolios affect the sizeofthe stochastic transfers.- 10-
TheHermite formula tells us which 36 points to evaluate, and the weight to attach to
each point. Let z1 and v3 indicate the evaluation points for the two realizations of r and rR, with
i, j =l,...,6.Tables in Stroud and Secrest (1966) tell us that the best approximation is
achieved using points that are .436, 1.336, and 2.35 1 standard deviations away from the mean
in either direction. The best weights, x,, are .725 for the point closest to the mean, in either
direction, followed by .157, and .0045 on the point furthest from the mean. These weights do
not sum to one because they are not "probabilities" for the particular realizations. Instead, these
values were derived for the tables by a numerical search for whatever (z,v,x) combination
happens to provide the best possible approximation for the joint normal distribution.
The household selects its portfolio, and it plans a reporting fraction for each possible
realization of the portfolio return. Hence it must choose a vector of three assets, A, and a
vector of 36 reporting fractions, 6, to maximize final expected utility. With the use of the
Hermite formula, the consumer's optimization problem becomes
max 6 6 (7)
A,ôE(U) = x1 x [(l—p) VII(A,5;z1,v1)]pV [ld(A,6;zZ,vJ)]]
i—if.I
subjectto AD + A + AR =K,the fixed household capital. The consumer still realizes income
'dafterdetection, with probability p, and income L4 with probability (l-p). But these income
amounts are each now a function of the chosen asset vector A and reporting fractions 6, for each
of the 36 realizations (z, v,, for i, j, =1,6). The Appendix uses the Hermite integration
formula to derive explicit expressions for these functions, as used in the simulations.
A simultaneity problem is that the portfolio cannot be determined until the whole set of
oisderived, but these reporting fractions cannot be determined until total income is known. To
solve this problem, we start with an initial guess for A and then iterate to find the optimal 6 for- 11 -
each of the 36 outcomes. Armed with these reporting fractions, we use Newton's Algorithm to
revise the initial setting of A. We iterate between these two sub-problems to find a simultaneous
solution for A and 5. This solution captures the interactions between asset risk and evasion risk
within a single optimization. The entire solution must be repeated, however, for each trial price
vector along the search for a general equilibrium.
Next, we need to set the initial fractions of income reported in each sector. These are
crucial for our model, but difficult to define and to measure. At large corporations, accountants
work year-round with IRS auditors to negotiate appropriate tax amounts. Initial reporting may
be low, but settlements avoid high penalties. More appropriate for our model are the amounts
that individuals report. Fortunately, the IRS was able to compute for us the fraction reported
of each income type, as shown in Table i. Because of third-party reporting, IRS computers
can match individual tax returns with brokers' statements regarding corporate-source interest,
dividends, and capital gains. In Table 1, however, these categories include income originating
in both sectors. The table shows 92 percent reporting for "capital gains" which are mostly
corporate stock, and 61 percent reporting for Form 4797 gains from the sale of business
property. Most noncorporate income appears on Schedule C with 75 percent reporting, or rents
and royalties with 85 percent reporting. The bottom of the table combines six mostly-corporate
categories (96 percent reporting) and four mostly-noncorporate categories (76 percent reporting).
The difference is important for our purposes, so we use .8 for .
For the rest of the model, the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances contains detailed
information on end-of-year household assets, sources of earnings, and consumption expenditures.
These numbers pertain only to understatements by those who file tax returns. Evidence
in IRS (1988) suggests that about a quarter of the rental income received by nonfilers
should have been reported. The $100 billion tax gap mentioned in our introduction
includes both filers and nonfilers.- 12-
Berkovecand Fullerton (1992) extract the data from the survey, aggregate the many asset types
into the three used here, and categorize households into eight income groups. We use sample
weights from the survey to aggregate up to a single representative household.
In order to derive the marginal tax rates applicable to each type of asset income (tD, tF,
and tR), the eight household rates are weighted by holdings of each asset and the survey weights.
The capital gains rate is 20 percent of the tax rate on dividends, to capture the 60 percem
exclusion, the advantage of deferral, and the step-up of basis at death. The complete set of
parameters used in our model is displayed in Table 1.
The real return to debt, rD, is set at 0.05 in the benchmark equilibrium, and the nominal
interest rate is ten percent. The real return to equity is r =0.12,and the real return to real
estate is r =0.11. When underreported rental income remains undetected the real net return
to real estate is .0639, but when evasion is detected it falls to 0.0032 because of the penalty and
the psychic cost (see the paragraph that starts after equation 4).
The coefficient of relative risk aversion, (3, is set at 2 for the standard case. This value
conforms with estimates found in the literature (e.g. Friend and Blume, 1975), but we vary it
for sensitivity analysis. The variance of the return to each risky asset is then calibrated so that
the asset holdings reported in the survey are optimal, given the derived after-tax real rates of
return, the specified risk aversion, and other data. These values also appear in Table 1.
Observed expenditures are then used to solve for Yi and 'Y2•8
8 An additionalcomplication is that tax revenue from asset income depends on all of the
tax evasion parameters. Most of these are set exogenously, but the psychic cost
parameter 0mustbe derived such that the taxpayer finds it optimal to report 80 percent
of rental income in the benchmark equilibrium, given all other taxes, audit rates, and
penalties, and given the intercept of the linear tax schedule. A simple iterative procedure
derives values simultaneously for the psychic cost and the tax intercept. In the end, the
linear tax system takes the form -3,591 + 0.329L, and 0becomes2. 14.- 13 -
Although penalties on detected evasion can vary, imposed fines in the U.S. are typically
one-half of the tax underpayment. Thus we set a to one-half. We set the parameters of the
probability of detection function so that the benchmark p falls in the reasonable range of 5 to
10 percent. Specifically, we assume that in the absence of evasion the IRS would audit 5.0
percent for prevention purposes, but when all rental income is evaded the probability of
detection rises to 90 percent. These figures provide particular values for a0 and a1, and they
imply that the audit rate for 20 percent evasion is p = 0.089.
Turning to the production side, we solve for the capital share parameter that makes the
observed use of factors equal to desired use of factors. The elasticity of substitution between
capital and labor is set at 1.0 for the base case, but it is varied for sensitivity analysis. Zero
profits implies that sales revenue equals factor cost, so solving for the scale parameter implies
4) = 1.051. Rates of economic depreciation are taken from Hulten and Wykoff (1981), while
other parameters for the five corporate assets are taken from Fullerton and Lyon (1988).
4, Results
We begin with the welfare cost of tax differences as it is calculated in previous literature.
In a benchmark equilibrium with no tax evasion, housing capital is effectively taxed at a 39.0
percent rate.'° Because of two layers of tax on corporate-source income, the overall effective
Since the household must know income before reporting, the value of depends on the
realization of the portfolio return. Thus ô is set to 0.8 whenever the mean return is
realized, but differs at each of the 36 points of the Hermite formula.
° The return pre-tax but net of maintenance and depreciation is 0.09 (=0.11-0.01-0.01)
and the net return as derived by equation (4) is 0.0549. Thus the effective tax rate
incorporates the effects of both personal and property taxes on rental housing.- 14-
taxon corporate capital is 52.6 percent.H When these taxes on capital are equalized, to collect
the same revenue, the common tax rate becomes 49.9 percent. We use this conceptual
experiment to measure the welfare cost of tax differences. Although not a realistic policy
proposal, it is equivalent to a reform that integrates corporate and personal tax systems and
applies the full 49.9 percent rate to real interest, dividends, and accrued capital gains.
Table 3 shows first, in column 1, the benchmark equilibrium values for asset holdings.
market returns, net returns, and compliance variables. Then in column 2 it shows the
corresponding post-adjustment values for comparison. Tax equalization induces a portfolio
reallocation away from real estate towards debt and equity, with a net 8.8 percent decrease in
real estate holdings. The net return to equity rises, while the net return to real estate falls.
As shown at the bottom of the column, overall welfare increases by 15.9 billion in 1983
dollars. This figure corresponds to 0.706 percent of National Income, well within the range of
previous estimates from models that ignore evasion.
Next we begin from a benchmark that includes tax evasion, in column 3.Initial
allocations are the same as in column 1, but the net return r is higher. We then conduct the
same experiment. Households respond in a similar manner, in column 4, but housing capital
decreases by 7.6 percent. Because of the higher tax on real estate, compliance deteriorates.
Still, however, welfare rises by $21.9 billion, or 0.968 percent of National Income. Thus the
efficiency cost of statutory tax differences is 37 percent larger than when measured in the
previous type of model that ignores tax evasion.
Using equation (5), the gross return to corporate capital is 0.1137. Using (4), the
weighted average of net returns to corporate debt and equity is 0.0539. The percentage
difference is an effective tax rate that combines effects of personal, corporate, and
property taxes.It is not much higher than the statutory rate on corporate income,
because of credits and deductions such as for nominal interest payments.- 15-
Taxevasionexacerbatespreexisting distortions by reducing further the low effective
taxationofhousing capital. With evasionin the benchmark, the effectivetax rate is35.0 percent
insteadof 39.0 percent. This influence of evasion on tax distortions has not previously been
explicitly recognized and measured.
Thetablealsopresents equilibrium prices. During bothconceptualexperiments, thereal
pre-taxrate of return toreal estateincreases while thepost-tax return falls.Also,both the real
pre-tax and post-taxrates ofreturn toequityrise.Since the taxequalizationexperiments are
designedtoberevenue neutral, the tax scalar falls slightly to return the additional revenue. The
cost ofcorporatecapitalrdecreases, causingcapital to flow into thecorporatesector.
Next,Table3also showsresultsofpolicyexperiments.Justascurrentpolicyfails to
minimizetheefficiencycost ofcapitalmisallocations,italso may fail to use optimal enforcement
strategies.Thepenalty rate isincreased from0.5 to0.6incolumn5,where portfolios change
little, but theannual welfare gain is $150 million. This net figure balances the gain from real
resource allocation,asina standard Harbergermodel, plusthe gain from slightlyreduced
marginal tax rates, against the loss inutilityfrom ahigher penaltyand increased riskinessof the
reporting decision.Complianceimprovesby a merefour-tenths of onepercent, raisingthe
reporting fractionto0.8032.Evasionin thismodelis deterred both by the IRS penalty and by
0,the psychiccost of detection. This policy experiment changes only the IRS penalty, not the
psychic cost,so the percentagechange intotal deterrenceissmallerthanthe percentage change
inthe IRSpenalty.U Because effectson compliance and portfolio composition aresmall,
equilibrium pricesdo not change measurably.
12InBecker's (1968)model,with risk-neutral taxpayers,thegovernmentcansave audit
costs and raisepenaltieswithout limit.Polinsky andShavell(1979)pointoutthatthe
optimalpenaltyshouldbelower with risk averseagents andimperfect detection,in order
toaccount properlyforthe riskfacing theseagents. Yitzhaki (1987)notesthat "[e]ven
if the penaltyrate is ashigh as 400 percent,theprobability ofdetection would haveto
exceed0.2in orderforevasionto be prevented."- 16-
Asan alternative means of reducing tax cheating, in column 6, theIRS can change the
frequency of audits. In this model, however, the probabilityof detection, p, is a function of the
reporting fraction, 5. Therefore we change both parameters a0 and a, ofthe probability function,
equation (2), such that taxpayers are audited with 6 percent frequency ratherthan the previous
5percentwhen all rental income is truthfully reported. Since the relationship between S and p
is monotonic, this change represents a shift in the audit function.'3 At the initial level of
compliance (i.e., 80 percent), the probability of detection increases from 0.089 to 0.107. Then
in the simulation, when households respond to the higher audit function by reducing tax evasion,
the endogenous probability of detection decreases slightly to 0.0961.
In the final equilibrium, voluntary reporting increases from 80 percent to 82.6 percent.
The equilibrium expected net return to the evaded asset falls from 0.0585 to 0.0581, which
causes a portfolio reallocation of 0.43 percent of real estate capital. The net change in welfare
is $382 million, or 0.017 percent of National Income. In this general model, two effects work
in each direction. Consumer utility is reduced in a direct sense by the greater chance of audit,
and in an indirect sense by the administrative cost of the additional IRS audits. This cost, which
is a pure loss to society, increases by $466 million in this simulation. As a result, total
enforcement cost rises from 1.0 percent to 1 .08 percent of government revenue. In the other
direction, the higher value of p reduces the size of the evasion gamble for risk-averse taxpayers.
Finally, in addition, the higher level of compliance helps to reduce the efficiency cost of capital
misallocation in this model. The net gain is the $382 million.
LAnothereffective deterrent to non-compliance is third party reporting, like the 1099
forms (see Witte and Woodbury, 1983).Although our model cannot explicitly
accommodate changes in independent information gathering by the IRS, results would be
similar to those here for an increase in the probability of detection.- 17-
Nextwe turn to marginal tax rates. In this model, a uniform reduction in marginal tax
rates will reduce evasion of rental income taxes and thereby improve the efficiency of capital
allocation. We measure the responsiveness of compliance in our model to a ten percent cut in
personal tax rates, but with no change in equilibrium prices. Reporting increases from 80
percent to 81 .33 percent of rental income, so the elasticity of evasion with respect to the tax rate
is 0.657. This figure is well within the range of Clotfelter (1983) who finds that a ten percent
tax cut will reduce evasion by anywhere between 5.0 and 8.94 percent.
For effects of actual rate reduction on evasion, we consider the Tax Reform Act of 1986
(TRA86). This Act lowered tax rates but broadened the taxable base so as to keep revenue
approximately the same. The capital gains exclusion and the investment tax credit were
repealed, and the corporate tax rate was decreased from 46 to 34 percent. The Act increased
depreciation lifetimes but altered the depreciation methods.All of these changes are
incorporated in our model.'4
Column 7 of Table 3 reports equilibrium responses to the total package of reforms. In
particular, the reported fraction of taxable rental income rises from 80 percent to 87 percent.
This change in 5 is not due solely to the decrease in marginal tax rates, but also to the decrease
in the endogenous audit rate, the change in household income, and effects on all real rates of
return. TRA86 increases welfare by $7.2 billion per year, or .320 percent of National
'Forpersonal rate reduction, we use estimates in Berkovec and Fullerton (1992).
Weighted by type of income, the rate on labor income decreases from 0.329 to 0.232,
the rate for debt decreases from 0.350 to 0.238, the rate for equity decreases from 0.481
to 0.27 1, the capital gains exclusion is repealed, and the rate for real estate decreases
from 0.411 to 0.260. To represent the broadening of the tax base, we decrease the
income exclusion so as to keep constant total revenue.- 18-
Income.5These gains arise from the reallocation in resources induced by the changes in the
effective taxation of capital in each sector, and from the changes in compliance. Lower tax rates
induce investors to report a higher fraction of their rental income, which reduces detection
uncertainty and lowers the resource cost of IRS audits.
The repeal of the investment tax credit raises the cost of equipment, but the cuts in
corporate and personal tax rates reduce the overall effective tax on corporate capital from 52.6
to 42.3 percent. In the housing sector, the lower personal tax rate on rent is partially offset by
the slower depreciation of structures and by higher reporting of rental income. The effective
tax on housing capital falls only from 39.0 percent to 34.6 percent. Therefore TRA86 makes
investing in the corporate sector relatively attractive than it was before. It reduces the
disparities in the taxation of capital across sectors.
Finally, we test the misspecification in previous studies that ignore tax evasion. If we
start with a benchmark without evasion and simulate the effects of TRA86, then welfare
increases by $3.6 billion annually (.16 percent of National Income). This gain derives primarily
from the Act's reduction of tax disparities across sectors. Yet, in our model with tax evasion,
the same reform raises welfare by $7.2 billion annually (.32 percent of National Income). Thus
the efficiency gain from tax reform is doubled by the consideration of tax evasion.
5. Sensitivity and Extensions
We now vary some key assumptions in our model. First, the standard model uses 0.8
for the initial noncorporate reporting fraction, 6, and 2.0 for the coefficient of relative risk
In comparison, Gravelle (1989) finds that the tax reform increased welfare by 0.86
percent of consumption, and Fullerton and Mackie (1989) find gains about 0.35 percent
of total welfare (the present value of income and the value of leisure).- 19-
aversion,3. These parameter values are varied in Table 4. If the initial reporting fraction were
only 0.7, then welfare gains would be larger for equalizing tax rates, for increasing the penalty
or audit rate, or for TRA86. Increases in ô reduce those gains. If ô were 0.9, the higher audit
rate entails more administrative cost than efficiency gain. In contrast, varying the degree of risk
aversion has little effect on tax distortions. Tax equalization does not change the total riskiness
of household portfolios, because part of low-risk real estate holding is converted to high-risk
corporate equity. This table shows calculations for /3=6 in this identical-consumer model, to
compare later with calculations for 13=6 in the multiple-consumer model. In other tests, we
found that results were not sensitive to: the elasticity of substitution in production (i),theslope
of the probability function (a1 relative to a0 in equation 2), and an "open economy" assumption
with a fixed world interest rate (see our 1992 working paper).
We turn now to a different extension of the basic model. Instead of many identical
households, eight different groups are distinguished by the level of total income. These eight
consumers face different marginal tax rates, supply different amounts of labor, and own
progressively larger amounts of capital. All households hold all assets (see Berkovec and
Fullerton, 1992). All evade twenty percent of their rental income, and they all face the same
probability of detection. The relevant household-specific parameters for this model are derived
exactly as in the base model. We also derive sixteen multiplicative parameters (one for each
risky asset for each household) that modify the "perceived" riskiness of each asset, in such a
way that the desired asset holdings in the benchmark are the same as observed holdings in the
data set. Finally, for the model to solve, the coefficient of relative risk aversion for all eight
households must be set to 6.16
6Weraise /3from2 to 6 to insure that total income is always positive for every group, as
required to evaluate our utility function. Expected income is always positive, when 3
is 2.0, but some of the 36 evaluation points include large negative returns to equity and
real estate. In addition, Friend and Hasbrouck (1980) found empirical support for the- 20-
Our1992 working paper includes results from all experiments using the eight-consumer
model, but in Table 5wereport results only from the change in penalties and audit rates. The
effects for the middle-income household in the eight-consumer model in Table 5aresimilar to
those for the one-consumer model with the same risk aversion parameter in Table 4.
Although these changes in enforcement policies have small aggregate effects, they have
interesting distributional effects. When we increase the penalty, as a fraction of the unpaid tax,
high-bracket households have more incentive to comply and to reduce their rental housing
investment. A higher audit affects all brackets similarly, and it has more effect on reporting.
In both cases, households in the top three income brackets shift out of real estate. The resulting
increase in the gross return to real estate restores its attractiveness for low-bracket households.
The middle classes reap the benefits from the improved allocation of resources, while the
households in the top and bottom brackets become worse-off. More frequent audits inflict
substantial losses on the wealthiest taxpayers, primarily due to income effects. Nevertheless,
the sum of gains exceeds the losses. These results are consistent with the findings of the single
household formulation of the model.
6.Conclusion
We use a general equilibrium simulation model to show how tax evasion can exacerbate
tax differences across sectors. By underreporting income from the least-taxed asset, households
exacerbate misallocation of capital and increase the economic inefficiency of the 1983 tax
structure by 37 percent.Existing measures of tax distortions that ignore evasion are
misspecified and substantially underestimate the efficiency cost of capital taxation.
higher value of the coefficient of relative risk aversion.-21 -
We also show that attempts by the IRS to curb non-compliance, either by auditing a
larger number of returns or by imposing higher penalties, can affect both the reporting and the
investment decisions of households. We use the model to gauge the impact of the 1986 Tax
Reform Act. The reduction in marginal tax rates induces higher levels of compliance, which
adds to the welfare gains. Other models miss the effect of compliance on capital allocation and,
consequently, they underestimate the effect of TRA86 on economic efficiency. Thus effects of
tax evasion are not limited to individual evaders and leakage of revenue. Tax evasion can affect
household investment decisions, equilibrium prices, and the allocation of capital.Appendix
Assets AE andARhave stochastic returns, while asset AD is riskless. Let
=
= rRtR
whereandare the mean returns on the two assets, and UEandu are distributed N(Oj).
Let aEand bethe standard deviations of each stochastic return, andbe the correlation
coefficient. The next step is to express expected utility in terms of normally distributed variates
with mean zero. This is necessary in order to apply the Hermite integration formula to each of
the two integrals in the utility function.
The utility function from equation (1) can now be expressed in terms of u as:
(Al) E(') =ff[(1-p)V(I) +pV(Id)]f(uE,uR)dUL4UR
where
l= I + uEA[ + URAR(l16)
'd'd + UEAE+uRAR[l-t-(at+O)(l-ô)]
where I and 'dindicatetotal expected income in each case, and where2 2 2 1 UEUR 2uEuR
fluvuR)
=________ exp-
Ica(1_2) 2(1_2)a a 0E0R
Wedecompose the joint density into the product of the conditional and marginal densities, and
rewrite (Al) as
(A2)










isthe marginal p.d.f. Next we use the change of variable technique to transform the inner
integral of (A2), in order to express the function in terms of the variable z. Recall that z times




Solving for UEandtaking the total differential gives the following solution for dut:.duE =dzI2(l_2)
Substituting duE back into the utility function and the two constraints, we obtain:
E( = -p)1(z)] ÷p1Iz)]]e
Using the Hermite integration formula, we replace the variable z by its realization z,, the term
exp (-z2) by the weights x, and sum over the 6 points, to obtain:
E(') = x((1—p) V[I(z1)] +PV[Jd(Z.)])}flUR)dUR
We repeat the same procedure again by performing change of variables to transform URinterms
of v, and use the Hermite integration formula to derive the utility function that is maximized as
equation (5) in the main text, where
I =z +rz cgv.+z1f1_ci2] +ARvfioR(1—rô)
+
V2AEoEtVi(?)+zi +ARvJoR/[1—t—(at÷6)(1)]REFERENCES
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Wages. Salaries, Tips 2,241898 72.7 2,237664 99.8
Taxable interest income 180,065 5.8 177,417 98.5
Dividend Income 70,323 2.3 67,707 96.3
State and Local Tax Refunds 10,934 0.4 10,843 99.2
Alimony Received 2,428 0.1 2,289 94.3
Business Income (or Loss) Schedule C 157,616 5.1 118,533 75.2
Capital Gain or Loss Schedule D 157772 5.1 145,636 92.3
Capital Gain Distributions 980 0.0 900 91.8
Other Cams (or Losses) 1/
Form 4797 4,528
Taxable IRADistributions 12,204 0.4 11,333 92.9
Taxable Pensions & Annuities 133,278 4.3 131,328 98.5
Rents, Royalties, other Schedule E 80,610 2.6 68,458 84.9
Farm Income (or Loss) Schedule F 3,224 0. I -2,774 -86.0
Unemployment Compensation 11,958 0.4 11,135 93.1
Taxable Social Security Benefit 14,543 0.5 13,936 95.8
Other Income (or Loss) 849 0.0 -12,607 -1484.9
Total Taxable Income 3,083,210 100.0 2,984,487 96.8
Tax Exempt Income 32,249 n.a. 31,635 98.1
Total Income 3,115,459 n.a. 3,016,122 96.8
Total "Corporate' 2/ 554,622 534,322 96.3
Total "Noncoiporate" 3/ 245,978 186,970 76.0
Total "Corporate"
excluding pensions and IRA's 409,140 391,660 95.7
Notes:
1/ Consists of gains or losses incurred in the sale of business property.
2/ Includes taxable interest, dividends, capital gains, capital gains distributions, taxable IRA distributions, and
pensions and annuities.
3/ Includes business income (schedule C), other 'ains and losses (form 4797), rents and royalties (schedule E), and
farm income (schedule F).
Source: IRS. We are grateful to Joel Stuhhs of the IRS for running these tabulations Irom the 1988 iape of the




taxrate on labor income 0.329
taxrate on debt (interest income) 0.350
tax rate on equity income 0.458
tax rate on real estate income 0.411
t1. property tax rate on real estate 0.0 18
u corporate tax rate in 1983 0.46
d economic depreciation rate 0.01
b debt/equityratio 0.5
e fraction of equity retained 0.5
B. Chosen for this model
real return to debt 0.05
rE real return to equity 0.12
rg real rental rate 0. 11
correlation coefficient 0.084
m maintenance rate 0.01
inflation rate 0.05
a elasticity of substitution in production 1.0
5 reporting fraction 0.8
fi coefficientof risk aversion 2.0
a rate of penalty on tax underpayment 0.5
C. Calculatedhere
costof capita] 0.1137
p capitalshare in production 0.0983
scale parameter in production 1.051
p probability of detection 0.089
O psychiccost 2. 14
sE standard deviation of equity 0. 1945
SR standard deviation of real estate 0.1644
Source: Tax rates are from Berkovec and Fullerton (1992), except for the property tax rate
from King and Fullerton (1984). The debt/equity and retention ratios are also from King and
Fullerton (1984). The reporting fraction is from IRS data in Table 1, and risk aversion estimates
appear in Friend and Blume (1975) and Friend and Hasbrouck (1980). The chosen parameters
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ô=0.7 1.042 0.016 0.031 0.385
ô=0.8 0.968 0.007 0.017 0.320
ô=0.9 0.874 0.004 -0.001 0.250
with 5=0.8,
and
13=2.0 0.968 0.007 0.017 0.320
13=3.0 0.953 0.007 0.016 0.320
13=6.0 0.913 0.008 0.014 0.319
ô is the reporting fraction, and 13 is the coefficient of risk aversion.T
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